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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POLICE:
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT*
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER**
Our topic is the Constitution and the police. With a new Chief Justice
and the prospect of major change in the personnel of the Supreme Court,
police power and individual rights are sure to be reexamined. Many ob-
servers confidently predict a new relationship between courts and the po-
lice. You can look forward to it with anticipation, apprehension or
dread, depending on your perspective.
In order to understand what lies ahead, we must first consider the past.
Was the Burger Court really so different from its predecessor? Are the
continuities more important than the liberal-to-conservative shifts in the
details of a particular doctrine? Many people think so. I will point out
what I view as important differences between the Warren and Burger
Courts, though they are not the liberal-conservative differences that are
usually supposed.1 I will suggest first that there were really two Warren
Courts. Pursuing my theme of jurisprudential schizophrenia, I will then
try to convince you that there have been three distinct Burger Courts.
Earl Warren assumed office in 1953. From the very beginning, his
tenure was marked by vigorous pursuit of equality and civil liberty, for
* The lecture upon which this article is based was delivered on September 20, 1987, as the
Jerome W. Sidel Lecture at the annual Constitutional Conference jointly sponsored by the St. Louis
Chapter of the American Jewish Congress and by the Washington University School of Law.
** Frank & Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Studies in
Criminal Justice, University of Chicago Law School.
1. For further background on the differences between the Warren and Burger Courts, and
helpful discussion of the salient themes of these two periods, see, Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal
Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM 518; Arenella, Rethink-
ing the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72
GEO. L.J. 185 (1983); KAMISAR, THE WARREN COURT (WAS IT REALLY So DEFENSE-MINDED?),
THE BURGER COURT (WAS IT REALLY So PROSECUTION-ORIENTED?) AND POLICE INVESTIGA-
TORY PRACTICES, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi,
ed. 1983); KAMISAR, The "Police Practices" Phases of the Criminal Process and The Three Phases of
the Burger Court, in The Burger Years (H. Schwartz ed. 1987); Seidman, Factual Guilt and the
Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 436 (1980).
Washington University Open Scholarship
12 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 66:11
example, in school desegregation,2 political reapportionment, 3 and the
ban on prayer in the public schools.4
But in the area of police practices, the early Warren Court mirrored its
predecessor. The Court (with Chief Justice Warren concurring) held
that evidence seized illegally, by what the Court called a flagrant viola-
tion of the fourth amendment, could still be used in state criminal trials.5
The Court continued to allow extended police interrogation without
counsel and without any attempt to warn the suspect of his rights.6 In
fact for the entire first half of Earl Warren's tenure, from 1953 until
1961, the criminal decisions gave almost no evidence of what we today
think of as the Warren Court approach.
In the field of criminal procedure, the second Warren Court, what I
would call the "real Warren Court", emerged in 1961 with the landmark
decision in Mapp v. Ohio.7 Mapp held that illegally seized evidence was
inadmissible in state trials-the so-called exclusionary rule. There fol-
lowed a period of remarkably rapid, comprehensive innovation. In 1963,
in Gideon v. Wainwright,8 the Court guaranteed the right of the indigent
to be represented by counsel in a felony case. We must pinch ourselves
to remember that before 1963, though Earl Warren had served as Chief
Justice for almost ten years, it still was permissible under some circum-
stances to try an indigent without counsel, even in a serious criminal
case.
In 1964 (and again it seems incredible that this came so late) the Court
held for the first time that states must respect the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination.9 In 1966 the Court held, in its famous
Miranda decision, 10 that the fifth amendment privilege extends to sus-
pects questioned in police custody, and requires a detailed warning about
the suspect's constitutional rights.
These and other decisions that guaranteed for the first time the right to
confront witnesses," to jury trial12 and so on, truly transformed the face
2. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
4. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
5. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
6. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
9. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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of American criminal justice. This all occurred in the space of the eight
brief years from 1961 to 1969.
What factors produced the new, the "real", Warren Court? One obvi-
ous element was the replacement of Justice Frankfurter with Justice
Goldberg in 1962. But in accounting for the Mapp decision, which came
a year before Goldberg joined the Court, and in accounting for the voting
behavior of Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and White, a major factor
has to be the Justices' actual experience with the realities of deference to
police and to locally elected state courts. The Justices experienced first-
hand a recurring frustration with the meager results produced by gentle
prodding and by the cautious exercise of judicial restraint.
Consider one example. In a 1954 California case,13 police illegally en-
tered the defendant's home several times and installed microphones.
They installed one microphone in the defendant's bedroom and listened
to conversations there for over a month. The Supreme Court reaffirmed
the view that states could not be required to exclude the evidence.1 4 But
the Court issued a blistering criticism of the police behavior.15 Several
Justices called upon the Attorney General to consider criminal prosecu-
tion of the officers. The FBI investigated but never sought an indictment.
So in the end what message did the police really get?
Experiences like this were in the background of the Warren Court's
eventual, and some would say very belated, recognition of the need for
vigorous remedies.
Even so, the transformation of the Warren Court-the "greening" of
the Warren Court-was never complete. The old, conservative Warren
Court surfaced, often unexpectedly, throughout the 1960s. In some ways
the old Court gained the upper hand again during the last two years of
Warren's tenure, though no change in the Court's membership can ac-
count for this development. 6 The Court rejected important civil liberties
claims related to jury service by women17 and blacks. 8 It limited its
fourth amendment decisions. For example, the Court allowed some
12. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
13. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
14. 347 U.S. at 134.
15. 347 U.S. at 137.
16. Justice Tom Clark retired and was replaced by Justice Thurgood Marshall in 1967. Clark
had written Mapp, but nonetheless was generally a conservative on law enforcement issues; he dis-
sented, for example, in Miranda.
17. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
18. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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street searches on less than probable cause 9 and denied the exclusion
remedy to defendants who lack so-called "standing. ' '20
Even the heralded Miranda decision must be seen as a deeply ambiva-
lent compromise. Miranda was a response to several problems in the law
of police interrogation. Previous precedents judged interrogation prac-
tices on an amorphous case-by-case basis.21 The law left police and lower
courts without guidance. The situation made it difficult for federal
courts to insure that local judges, who were often unsympathetic to the
rights of the accused, would respect constitutional claims. 22
In addition, and the Miranda opinion stressed this problem repeatedly,
the secrecy of police interrogation made it difficult to know what actually
occurred in the interrogation room. 23 Judicial fact-finding depended on a
swearing contest, with several respectable police officers on one side and
an unsavory suspect on the other. In this kind of a swearing contest, a
defendant's claims about beating, psychological abuse, or questioning for
hours on end will just not be believed, whether they happen to be true or
not. The defendant will almost always be the loser.
Miranda addresses these problems in two ways. First, it grants the
suspect an absolute right to silence.24 Second, it requires that the suspect
receive a series of detailed warnings before he can validly waive that
right. 25
The right to silence eliminates the slippery and uncontrollable case-by-
case approach, in which the degree of pressure on the suspect was some-
how "balanced" against the law enforcement need for a confession.26
The warnings are intended to insure that the suspect is aware of his
rights and has the opportunity to consult counsel. Counsel in turn is
important not only to advise the defendant but also as a much-needed
observer. The Miranda Court explained that "the need for counsel to
protect the fifth amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to
consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel pres-
19. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
20. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
21. See Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966), reprinted
in Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 524 (1980).
22. See Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REv. 865 (1981).
23. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
24. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.
25. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-73.
26. See Schulhofer, supra note 22.
[Vol. 66:11
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ent during any questioning if the defendant so desires." 27
The trouble with all this is that any request for counsel must be made
while the suspect is still isolated in police custody, still surrounded by
what the Court called "hostile forces," forces whose presence makes free
choice so difficult. In fact, it is only from these "hostile forces" that the
suspect gets the crucial warnings.
Listen to the Miranda Court again: "[the defendant has] not merely a
right to consult with counsel prior to questioning but also to have coun-
sel present ... if the defendant so desires." The coherence of Miranda's
reasoning and much of its practical value collapse with those last five
words. Miranda conditions the presence of counsel on the defendant's
choice and then assumes that a free choice can be made by an isolated
prisoner who must communicate his decision to the very people whose
hostility has created the need for counsel in the first place. And notice
that no neutral witness need be present to observe or record a waiver of
counsel, a waiver which will later be claimed by those respectable police
officers and denied by the unsavory suspect.
In short, Miranda does precious little to break the wall of isolation
surrounding the target of a custodial interrogation, and it does nothing
whatsoever about the all-important swearing contest.
I don't want to suggest that Miranda has no value at all. Its recogni-
tion that the prisoner has some rights conveys an important symbolic
message to the suspect and, above all, to the police. Miranda helped
educate police officers and raised law enforcement standards considera-
bly. It was nonetheless a deeply ambivalent compromise. Far from
"handcuffing the police," it was riddled with loopholes. The first Warren
Court, the conservative Warren Court, was evident even in Miranda.
That brings us to 1969, when Warren Burger became Chief Justice.
The product of the Burger Court was a very mixed bag. Those who like
to think in terms of simple liberal-conservative stereotypes are con-
founded by some of the progressive and activist decisions of the 1970s
and, 80s. In 1972 the Burger Court struck down standardless sentencing
in capital cases,28 thus tackling a momentous problem that the Warren
Court had failed to reach. In 1975 the Burger Court held that excluding
women from mandatory jury service was unconstitutional,2 9 overruling
27. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
28. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
29. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 520 (1975).
1988]
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(in effect) a 1960's decision of the Warren Court.30
This phenomenon continued into the last and most conservative years
of the Burger Court. In 1985, for example, the Burger Court restricted
the use of deadly force by police officers,31 a problem of major impor-
tance on which the Warren Court had never spoken. In 1986 the Burger
Court restricted the use of peremptory challenges against black jurors, 32
explicitly overruling a 1965 decision of the Warren Court.33 These crimi-
nal procedure innovations were coupled with other progressive advances,
including attention to sex discrimination 34 and the abortion ruling,35
which was (like it or not) certainly the most activist decision of the past
half-century.
Against this background, the claim can be made, very plausibly made,
that the Warren Court was not so radical after all. And the Burger
Court was hardly conservative. There are important continuities. Some-
times, most surprising of all, decisions seemed to be guided by law rather
than by politics.
Still, the confusing mix of liberal and conservative results in both
Courts does not tell the whole story. In criminal procedure particularly,
there were crucial changes in emphasis, in tone, and in the Court's ar-
ticulated goals.
The Warren Court, whatever its penchant for caution and compro-
mise, left no doubt about its sense of mission. The Court said, for exam-
ple, that "[tlhere can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has."36 Of course, the Court
stopped miles short of fully implementing this insight. Statements like
that left the Court wide open to the rigid logic of academic criticism. But
the Court's goal was clear, its goal was the right one, and it was taking
steps to get closer to the objective.
Three broad themes predominated in the Warren Court. One was the
egalitarian impulse, the effort to stamp out not only racial discrimination
but also to insure fair treatment for rich and poor alike. A second theme
concerned the dangers of unchecked executive power. We have seen
30. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
31. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 81 (1985).
32. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
33. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
34. Eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss1/3
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND ENFORCEMENT
many of those dangers materialize in the Iran-Contra mess. In the crimi-
nal process, the checks and balances come from a vigorous adversary
system. The Warren Court saw the adversary systems of the state courts
as woefully deficient. It set out to bring those systems up to the stan-
dards long followed by federal courts, standards that are set forth explic-
itly in the Bill of Rights.
There was a third theme, a preoccupation with practical implementa-
tion. The Court knew that criminal justice administration, like any
large, amorphous bureaucracy, will not respond automatically and with
enthusiasm to every new pronouncement from above. The Court under-
stood that it was not enough simply to declare new rights. It usually
chose to formulate those rights in bright-line terms, in order to make
evasion more difficult. And the high visibility landmark holdings were
accompanied by more technical decisions that widened access to federal
courts, in order to insure a forum and a realistic remedy."
Now let us turn to the police practice decisions in the Burger Court.
Looking closely at the Burger Court product, we can identify three dis-
tinct phases in its work.38 For its first six or seven years, the Burger
Court showed considerable hostility toward the Warren Court
landmarks of the 1960s. It dismantled protection against misidentifica-
tion at police line-ups.39 Both Miranda and the exclusionary rule,
though left nominally intact, were repeatedly eroded.' The Court never
once in this entire period held that a confession should be excluded.41
In the late 1970s the tone changed. The Burger Court (often over the
Chief Justice's dissent) breathed new life into Miranda,42 and it strength-
ened the fourth amendment warrant requirement.43 Ironically, this mod-
erate phase of the Burger Court, this tilt to the left, coincided with the
retirement of Justice Douglas, the Court's most liberal member, who was
replaced by Justice Stevens in 1977.
37. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
38. See Kamisar, The "Police Practices" Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of
the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS 143 (H. Schwartz ed. 1987).
39. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
40. See, eg., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973).
41. See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Cr. REv. 99.
42. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980).
43. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977).
1988]
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But the moderate Burger Court had a painfully short life span. It ab-
ruptly expired in its fourth or fifth year. Starting in 1981 a new Burger
Court, perhaps the real Burger Court, emerged. Justice O'Connor re-
placed Justice Stewart, a centrist Republican, an Eisenhower appointee
who had been a swing vote in many cases involving searches and police
interrogation. Warren Burger served as Chief Justice for 17 years, but it
was mainly in the last five years of his tenure that his Court hit its stride
as an aggressively pro-law enforcement institution. In search and seizure
cases particularly, it began to seem almost impossible for the prosecution
to lose.44
More significant than the pattern of results was the way that the Bur-
ger Court succeeded in changing the discourse about police power and
individual rights. I mentioned that three themes permeated the Warren
Court decisions-pursuit of equality, reinforcement of adversarial proce-
dure, and a concern with practical implementation. In the Burger Court,
in fact in all three Burger Courts, these goals got short shrift. Instead,
the decisions talked first and foremost about the truth-finding function of
the criminal trial. The major goal of criminal procedure was no longer to
remedy the disadvantages of the poor or to control abuses of official
power but to accurately separate the guilty from the innocent.
There was much to be said for the renewed attention to this goal. The
Warren Court gave plenty of weight to law enforcement realities, (for
example, in the way that it crafted its remedies45) but it seldom talked
about the law enforcement realities. As a result, its decisions too often
gave credibility to politicians who charged that it was "handcuffing the
police" or favoring the "criminal forces" over the "peace forces." The
Burger Court was the Warren Court's mirror image. The Burger Court
gave weight to individual rights more often than is usually supposed, but
it talked the language of law enforcement, of redressing the balance, of
accurate factfinding. It was more important to convict the guilty than to
control the police, more important to know whether evidence was rele-
vant than to know whether it was tainted by irregularities in the
investigation.
44. See, eg., Illinois v. Kroll, 107 S.Ct. 1160 (1987); Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S.
227 (1986); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 604 (1983).
45. Note, for example, the way that the holding in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967),
permitted the prosecution to use an in-court identification by a witness who had previously been
exposed to an unconstitutional line up, so long as the government was able to demonstrate an "in-
dependent source" for the in-court identification.
[Vol. 66:11
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A second characteristic of the Burger years has to be called a method-
ology rather than a particular theme. It relates to the way the Court
analyzed questions rather than to its goals. The method of analysis was
instrumental; the focus was on costs and benefits.46 The Warren Court
would ask: Does the individual have a right? Does the state's practice
burden that right? The Burger Court usually would ask: Will the rem-
edy really deter? If so, to what extent? And how do the benefits com-
pare with the costs? On some implicit level, the Warren Court
undoubtedly considered the same pragmatic questions. But the questions
remained below the surface. They influenced only how far to go and how
fast. In the Burger years, these questions became primary.
The change in approach is very significant. The new language seems
less inspiring, but is also more realistic, perhaps even more honest. In
another sense it seems curiously unjudicial. In our constitutional my-
thology, the job of the courts, after all, is to find law, to ascertain the
rights of the individual, not to balance costs and benefits like a legislature
or even a construction engineer. In this sense, the Burger Court again
seemed even less respectful of the judicial role than the Warren Court
was, even less restrained in treading on the policy-making functions of
the other branches of government. Yet the Burger Court never got a bad
name for this in its criminal cases, probably because it tied its activist
methods to conservative results. It used cost-benefit analysis like a legis-
lature, but the government won.
In theory the cost-benefit analysis can be turned around. In more lib-
eral hands it could produce more activist results. But I don't think this
will happen. On the contrary, the reliance on cost-benefit, which now
lies embedded in almost two decades of precedent, has a built-in tilt.
Notice the way the questions are formulated. The costs of the exclu-
sionary rule are taken as obvious. The conviction is reversed. The crimi-
nal is assumed to be dangerous, and the reversal is assumed to set him
free. In fact, these assumptions may be inaccurate, but on the surface the
costs seem immediate and concrete.
What are the benefits? They involve safeguarding a zone of dignity
and privacy for every citizen, controlling abuse of power, preserving
checks and balances. One could view these as pretty weighty benefits,
perhaps even invaluable ones. But the Court has viewed them as ab-
stract, speculative.
46, See generally U.S. v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1985); U.S. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
1988]
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The Court has also questioned whether exclusion contributes to these
values by deterring the police.47 For some of us it seems crystal-clear
that the exclusion remedy, which police plainly dislike, is not irrelevant
to their behavior, that they will conduct more illegal searches if they can
make use of the fruits than if they cannot. As the Warren Court said in
Mapp, exclusion "compel[s] respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it."48
But the current Court calls this speculative too. It asks for evidence of
the benefits, for data to support the claims. In the absence of data, the
Court has repeatedly concluded that the tangible costs of excluding evi-
dence, the assumed release of an assumed dangerous criminal, far out-
weigh the speculative, undocumented benefits. The Court loads the dice
by its one-sided insistence on empirical proof. Then, to mix metaphors,
the Court puts its thumb on the scales in calculating the subjective cost-
benefit balance.
Let me give you an example to show how the analysis works in prac-
tice. The Internal Revenue Service suspected that a taxpayer named
Payner was concealing income in off-shore bank accounts. Its investiga-
tors knew that a bank officer, one Wolstencraft, was coming to Miami
and would have some of the relevant records in his briefcase. So the IRS
arranged to have Wolstencraft meet a woman named Kennedy, who
sometimes worked as an undercover agent for the IRS. And while Ken-
nedy plied her undercover trade and diverted Wolstencraft's attention,
IRS agents stole his briefcase, broke into it, and copied the documents.49
This was without doubt a flagrantly illegal search and a criminal of-
fense under Florida law. No one ever denied that. But previous deci-
sions had held that the exclusionary rule could be invoked only by the
immediate victim of a search,5° in other words only by Wolstencraft, not
by the taxpayer.
The reason for this standing requirement harks back to the idea that
the exclusionary rule aims to remove the incentive for police misconduct.
The police cannot use the product of an illegal search against its victim,
so they lose the incentive to conduct the search. The Court thought that
47. See U.S. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
48. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)
(emphasis added).
49. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
50. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
[Vol. 66:11
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suppression on behalf of third parties, non-victims, could not add signifi-
cantly to the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule.
Payner questioned whether this reasoning extended to a case like his.
The IRS was interested only in him, not in Wolstencraft. Moreover, the
IRS actually encouraged its agents to take advantage of the standing
loop-hole. I suppose it is a fine thing for police to be taught the nuances
of search and seizure law. But what the IRS did here was to instruct its
agents that because of the standing rule, they could purposely conduct
unconstitutional searches of one person in order to get usable evidence
against another person who was the real target of the investigation.
Now you might think that this is pretty clear evidence of the value of
suppression, that the failure to suppress under these circumstances will
have an obvious effect on incentives to comply with the fourth amend-
ment. But this evidence didn't satisfy the Supreme Court at all. It is not
statistical. And where the potential effects seem a matter of obvious
common sense to some, they remain a matter of mere speculation to
many of the Justices. In the Payner case, the Court concluded that given
"the considerable harm that would flow from indiscriminate application
of the exclusionary rule .... [,] the interest in deterring illegal searches
does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a
party who was not the victim of the challenged practices. '51
So Payner lost his case, and the Court took another bite out of the
exclusionary remedy. Similarly, the Court held that illegally seized evi-
dence can be used before grand juries, 52 in civil penalty proceedings, 3
and in deportation proceedings.5 4
Another significant inroad occurred in the cases adopting what is
sometimes called the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.5 5 I
have no objection to good faith. In fact, when I read fourth amendment
cases, I often feel that I would like to see more of it. But what the good-
faith exception does is to focus attention solely on the police officer exe-
cuting a search warrant. If his action is in good faith and reasonable, the
evidence comes in, even if the magistrate who issued the warrant was not
acting in good faith or was not reasonable. Why? Because the Court
decided that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter police, not
51. Payner, 447 U.S. at 735.
52. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
53. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
54. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
55. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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magistrates.5 6
Why not magistrates too? The Court in its Leon decision gave two
answers. First, the Court said, "[T]here exists no evidence suggesting
that... magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amend-
ment."5" Here I have to drop a footnote because the Court dropped a
footnote. As a footnote to its statement that there is no evidence that
magistrates ignore the fourth amendment, the Court concedes that some-
times magistrates do ignore the fourth amendment, specifically by rubber
stamping warrant requests that their fourth amendment role requires
them to screen. The Court's footnote simply says, "We are not con-
vinced that this is a problem of major proportions."5"
Returning to the Court's text, we find another reason for the new
"magistrate" loophole. "We discern no basis... for believing that exclu-
sion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant de-
terrent effect on the issuing ... magistrate."59
This type of reasoning is capable of growth. In fact, the Court in Leon
also speaks of the broader effects of exclusion, including the effects on
police. The Court says: "No empirical researcher.., has yet been able
to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect."'
The accumulation of loopholes, together with the instrumental method-
ology, the "loaded dice," and the "thumb on the scales," all suggest that
the Rehnquist Court may choose to focus its attention not only on a
simplification or contraction of search and seizure requirements but also
on complete abrogation of the exclusion remedy.
Let me spell out two alternatives to the Burger-Rehnquist approach to
the exclusionary rule. The first is to look a little more carefully at the
costs and benefits. Suppression is bound to affect incentives, and incen-
tives affect behavior. We cannot prove that criminal prosecutions deter
bribery, but we know there would be a lot more bribery if it were never
punished at all. In the same fashion, the emphasis with respect to the
exclusionary rule should not be on measuring precisely what the exclu-
sionary rule deters. Rather we have to ask what the absence of an exclu-
sionary rule would encourage. I submit that sensible people know the
answer to this question without awaiting sociological studies.
56. Id. at 916.
57. Id.
58. Id. n.14.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 918 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 66:11
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What about the costs? Contrary to appearances and contrary to the
Supreme Court's repeated rhetoric on the subject, the exclusionary rule
inflicts no costs on society at all. There are costs to be sure, if a danger-
ous criminal goes unconvicted. But these are the costs of the fourth
amendment itself, not costs of the exclusion remedy.
The fourth amendment denies government the power to search on less
than probable cause. When government complies with this requirement,
it sometimes fails to catch the guilty or gets insufficient evidence and
loses convictions. But all this the Framers intended. We can escape
these costs only by repealing the fourth amendment.
If we keep the fourth amendment and comply with it, as I think we
should, then there will be costs, but we cannot blame them on the exclu-
sionary rule.
Now let me mention a second and even more important alternative to
the Burger-Rehnquist cost-benefit approach. This is an alternative that
goes back not only to Mapp, but also to the Supreme Court's 1914 deci-
sion in the Weeks case.6' Weeks was the decision that first applied the
exclusionary rule in federal trials. Notice that the recent assault on the
exclusionary rule is not just an attack on Warren Court precedent; it is
an attack on the exclusion doctrine applied consistently in federal courts
for over seventy years. In the Weeks case the Court did not talk about
balancing costs against benefits. It reasoned that if a court cannot au-
thorize an unreasonable search before the event (and the fourth amend-
ment says clearly that it cannot), then the court cannot affirm or sanction
such a search after the event by using its fruits. The Court said: "The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles... embodi[ed] in the fundamental law of the land."62
This is the way of thinking that has grounded the exclusionary rule for
nearly all of its life.63 This is the way of thinking that permeates Justice
Brandeis' famous 1928 opinion in the Olmstead case." Justice Brandeis
wrote:
When the Government [sought] to avail itself of the fruits of these [illegal]
acts in order to accomplish its own ends, it assumed moral responsibility for
61. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
62. Id. at 393.
63. See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis"
Rather than on an "Empirical Proposition?" 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983).
64, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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the officers' crimes... [By using the evidence] the Government itself would
become a lawbreaker. .... If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law .... To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government
may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private crimi-
nal-would bring terrible retribution.
65
This is the way of thinking that preceded Mapp and was the original
basis for Mapp, what the Warren Court called "the imperative of judicial
integrity."' 6 6 In the Burger years the judicial integrity notion has been
pushed far into the background. One clue about where the Rehnquist
Court may go with this issue comes from a recent speech by one of our
court of appeals judges whose name sometimes turns up in the news.
Here is what Judge Robert Bork said about the exclusionary rule back in
1986:
I have never been convinced by that argument [that courts shouldn't soil
their hands by allowing in illegally seized evidence] because it seems the
conscience of the court ought to be at least equally shaken by the idea of
turning a criminal loose upon society. The only good argument really rests
on the deterrence rationale, and it's time we examine that with great care to
see how much deterrence we are getting and at what cost.
6 7
What is important here is not only the rejection of the judicial integrity
principle that goes back to Justice Brandeis and before. What is signifi-
cant is the way the cost-benefit issue is formulated. Judge Bork does not
state his conclusion, but I think you can catch the drift.
Now there are many more issues on the Court's agenda. Most of them
will seem awfully academic if the exclusionary rule is overturned. But let
me mention briefly three areas of importance. First, what kinds of pri-
vacy interests does the fourth amendment protect in the first place? As
you might expect, the scope of the fourth amendment has been shrinking.
Second, what protection does the fourth amendment guarantee in the
growing practice of administrative searches, when admittedly private ar-
eas are invaded, not by police but by government investigators wearing
different hats, in activities arguably collateral to traditional law enforce-
ment? Third,' what is the future of Miranda protections in police
interrogation?
65. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 483-85.
66. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).
67. Speech to Free Congress Foundation (1986), quoted in Miller, Bork and the Supreme
Court, THE BRIEF Summer 1987.
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The first question is, when do fourth amendment protections come
into play at all? The basic test has been whether the government action
defeats a reasonable expectation of privacy.68 The reasonable expecta-
tion concept has never been easy to apply, but it took on a major new
twist in two Burger Court decisions of the late 1970s. In the first, United
States v. Miller,6 9 the government served a subpoena requiring a bank to
produce microfilm records of its depositors' checks and financial records.
The defendant, one of the depositors, argued that this constituted a
search requiring probable cause and a warrant. The Court held that
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the bank records;
therefore no fourth amendment standards had to be met. The Court rea-
soned that the records had been "voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business." There-
fore, the Court concluded, "The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to
the government. '70
In the second case, Smith v. Maryland,71 the police used a "pen regis-
ter," which is a device that records all numbers dialed from the defend-
ant's home telephone. The device does not overhear conversations, but
permits police to identify the people who are called. The defendant ar-
gued that installation of such a device should meet fourth amendment
requirements.
Again, the Court held that the defendant had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed. Its reasoning was analo-
gous to that in the Miller case: "When [the defendant] used his phone,
[he] voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone com-
pany and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary
course of business. In doing so [he] assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed."72
What emerges here is an analysis that turns on identifying assumptions
of risk. If the defendant voluntarily turns information over to a third
party, even for a limited purpose, he is held to assume the risk that the
third party will turn that information over to the government. He as-
sumes that risk even if the third party conveys the information in viola-
68. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
69. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
70. Id. at 442-43.
71. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
72. Id. at 744.
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tion of a commitment to the defendant. And, notice that the third
parties in these cases are not taking the initiative. They are not running
to the government with suspicious information. The bank in Miller was
subpoenaed. Thus, the defendant not only assumes the risk that the third
party will betray a confidence. He also assumes the risk that a loyal con-
fidant will be forced to cooperate in revealing extensive personal details
for the government to scrutinize.
This kind of analysis does great violence to the expectations of privacy
that most of us share. The only factor that makes it at all plausible is the
Court's view that the defendant chose to assume these risks. But what
makes the assumption of risk voluntary? The bank depositor in the
Miller case had a choice. He could have decided not to have a bank
account. He could have decided to wait in line and pay his utility bills in
cash every month. The telephone user in the Smith case had a compara-
ble choice. He could refrain from using his telephone. But if you want
to participate in modem American life at all, you have to assume these
risks.
The assumption of risk approach simply cannot be used to decide
cases. The question always has to be, why should you have to assume a
particular kind of risk. That has to depend on the nature of the interest
invaded, the means that the government uses to invade it, and on the
defendant's ability to protect against the intrusion. Certainly, you can
have a society in which people who want to preserve a private domain
must avoid the telephone, handle all remotely personal affairs by cash,
and never confide in any associate or employee. But then, the question is
whether you aren't coming very close to the kind of suspicion-ridden,
claustrophobic society that the framers of the fourth amendment
abhored.
The problem surfaces again in connection with aerial surveillance.
This is destined to be one of the hot fourth amendment issues for the rest
of the 1990s. It combines fancy technology, the war on drugs, and sev-
eral other topical concerns.
In one case, decided just a year ago,73 police in Santa Clara, California
hired a private plane, flew over the defendant's backyard at an altitude of
only 1,000 feet, and observed marijuana. The yard was protected by two
fences, a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence. It certainly looks
as if the defendant had an expectation of privacy. Commenting on a
73. California v Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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related aerial surveillance case, Professor Wayne LaFave noted that the
property owner had tried to prevent surveillance by every means short of
anti-aircraft fire.74 But the Court held that the expectations were not
legitimate. Notice how the assumption-of-risk notion resurfaces. The
defendant did not exactly put his plants in a living room window. With
two high fences, he had tried pretty hard to keep out the intruding eye.
But for the Court, the decisive point was that the fence did not totally
preclude observation by the flying public.75 Therefore, the defendant
"chose" to assume the risk. Justice Powell in his dissent put his finger on
the major problem: "The risk that a passenger on such a plane might
observe private activities, and might connect those activities with partic-
ular people, is simple too trivial to protect against."76
The crucial consideration should be whether the defendant had any
alternatives. How could you protect against this trivial sort of risk, even
if you wanted to? You would have to build an opaque dome over your
yard. In other words, the alternative is not to have an outdoor yard at
all.
Of course, there is one other alternative. The homeowner does not
have to grow marijuana. This fact seems to play a large part in the
Court's instinctive sense that his expectations were not legitimate. But
notice that you cannot protect your privacy by choosing to grow only
roses or crabgrass. By saying that this investigation is not a fourth
amendment search at all, the Court makes surveillance permissible
whether or not the police have reason to think that something illegal is
happening. Most of those engaged in serious crime will find ways to keep
their activities under cover. Meanwhile the law-abiding public will be
exposed to surveillance not justified by any concrete suspicions.
A similar problem arises, and will be considered by the Supreme Court
this Term, in connection with searching through discarded trash.77 At
this point, I have descended from the heights of aerial surveillance to the
depths of garbage, from the sublime to the ridiculous. But you can learn
a lot about people from careful analysis of their trash. Is this a risk that
we all have to assume? Again, a real crook is not likely to toss his smok-
ing gun into his own trash barrel. And he is subject to search on prob-
74. La Fave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28
ARIZ. L. REv. 291, 304 (1986).
75. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211-12.
76. Id. at 223-24.
77. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
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able cause anyway. Why should the rest of us have to put up with this
sort of an intrusion in the absence of probable cause? 7
A second issue that is likely to be in the forefront during the 80s and
90s is the "question of the administrative search. The Court recognizes
that inspecting an employee's workspace,79 and of course examining his
blood or urine," does invade a protected fourth amendment interest.
But the Court has begun to say that when inspections are carried out in
connection with regulatory programs and are not part of a traditional
crime detection effort, the fourth amendment requirement of probable
cause sometimes evaporates."' AIDS testing, drug testing, and other reg-
ulatory inspections are likely to be attempted and expanded. Public pres-
sure to abandon fourth amendment principles is likely to grow.
The fourth amendment tradition has always left room for reasonable
public-interest inspections.8 2 But a major problem here is whether the
state of the technological art has been oversold.
We often hear that there is a simple, painless, non-intrusive test that
does no more than flag the presence of dangerous drugs. A requirement
that air traffic controllers, pilots and those who run our high-speed trains
get checked out in this way seems a modest price to pay for public safety.
Certainly, when airline hijacking became a major concern and airport
metal detectors became commonplace, few of us worried about the re-
sulting invasion of our privacy.
But the drug-testing proposals are different. They have been extended
to customs inspectors, police officers, and school teachers. They may one
day reach all public employees. What public health or safety concerns
justify that sort of a dragnet?
Moreover, it turns out that the tests are anything but simple and non-
intrusive. Apparently the presence of dangerous drugs can sometimes be
masked by commonplace drugs such as antibiotics. So more sophisti-
cated tests are necessary. If they are expensive, then some employees will
78. As expected, the Supreme Court's decision, rendered after the delivery of this lecture, ig-
nored the kinds of concerns expressed above. Adhering to a formalistic assumption-of-the-risk anal-
ysis, the Court held that examination of discarded trash did not constitute a "search" and thus was
not subject to any Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness. See California v. Greenwood,
108 S.Ct. 1625 (1988).
79. O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
80. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
81. New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
82. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967).
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be excused while others are singled out. And with more sophisticated
tests, wider patterns of medication usage will come to light. Medical and
psychological conditions requiring treatment will be easily inferable.
There is also the problem that our free enterprise system has quickly
created a new growth industry, and entrepreneurs are now offering vials
of pure urine to those who worry that their own may not pass the test.
Substitution has to be prevented. So your supervisor may have to watch
you closely while you give your urine sample. That's not the same as
walking through an airport metal detector.
AIDS testing raises other problems. The accuracy of the tests is a very
relative matter. The tests inevitably produce some false positives; that is,
people test positive for AIDS but the test result is false-they are not
carriers at all. When a high-risk population, such as intravenous drug
users, is tested, the false positive rate may be tolerable because the test
will identify numerous true positives. But in wider test populations, such
as Armed Forces personnel and prison inmates, the incidence of AIDS is
very low. It can be about as low as the false-positive rate, which is dic-
tated by the technical accuracy of the tests used. When this happens, a
test may identify several hundreds AIDS cases but only half of these will
be true positives. The rest will be falsely branded as carriers of AIDS.
So what do you do with the information? And even when the person is
a confirmed AIDS carrier, what should you be able to do with the infor-
mation? Public disclosure, with its inevitable harm to the AIDS victim,
needs to be carefully controlled.
The fourth amendment does not disable us from dealing with the seri-
ous drug and AIDS problems. But it does require that courts resist hasty
overreactions and take a hard look at the need for intrusion and at the
means employed.
The last topic I want to touch on concerns the fate of Miranda's re-
strictions on police interrogation. Throughout the Burger years, in a
process comparable to the one it followed in the exclusionary rule cases,
the Court chipped away at Miranda's rationale, and superimposed loop-
hole after loophole.83 The Justice Department now argues publicly that
Miranda should be completely overruled.
The problem with this view is twofold. First of all, Miranda as it
83. See, eg., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985);
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
30 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
stands has had little or no demonstrably negative impact on law enforce-
ment. Confession rates have dropped only slightly, and prosecutors have
often found that they can get convictions even without confessions. Con-
viction rates have not dropped perceptibly at all.84
The second difficulty is not a matter of empirical effects, but one of
principle. The fifth amendment says, in no uncertain terms, that no per-
son shall be compelled to incriminate himself. How then can we legiti-
mately attempt to hide from the criminal suspect the fact that he has a
right to remain silent? How can we subject him to repeated questioning
in a threatening custodial situation, where he has no opportunity to con-
sult with counsel and no opportunity to walk away from his interro-
gators? How can we pretend that such practices do not compel him to
speak? In the absence of the famous Miranda warnings, it is only natural
for a suspect facing custodial interrogation to conclude that he is obliged
to talk. Miranda does not go nearly far enough in protecting the suspect
from compulsion, but it is the least we can do to insure against state-
ments obtained only because the suspect felt he had no choice but to
speak.
I want to close, in accord with academic tradition, by posing a short
quiz. It is based on a situation that presents very starkly many of these
problems relating to the pursuit of truth in law enforcement and the pro-
tection of human rights in complex modern societies. It is a real case,
but it arises in a country that I will leave nameless for the moment.
Two law enforcement officials on patrol were shot and killed. An indi-
vidual mentioned as a possible suspect was picked up by the investigators
at 5:00 a.m. By 6:00 p.m. he was ready to give a statement which was
formally recorded by a court stenographer. A short time later, he was
taken to a hospital. Witnesses there observed roughly fifteen distinct in-
juries to his head, torso, and leg. Several cuts on his head required
stitches, and his right eye had been blackened. There was also bleeding
on the surface of that eye. He had long linear burns on his chest, shoul-
der, and chin. On his right thigh was a second degree burn, six inches
long and one-and-a-half inches wide.
When a doctor at the hospital prepared to treat the defendant's inju-
ries, an officer accompanying the suspect drew his pistol. The doctor was
unwilling to treat the suspect while a weapon was pointing directly at
him, so he asked the officer to put the gun away. The officer refused, and
84. See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435 (1987).
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the doctor then left the room. Two government agents spoke privately to
the defendant. When they emerged, the defendant refused further treat-
ment and signed a form stating that he was refusing treatment "against
medical advice."
At trial, when the prosecution attempted to make use of the defend-
ant's confession, the defendant testified that from the moment of his
arrest, he was punched, kicked, smothered with a plastic bag, electrically
shocked, and later chained to a hot radiator with his face, chest, and legs
touching the radiator. Two other witnesses, who had been in govern-
ment custody that day, testified that they heard the suspect being beaten
and calling for help. The government admitted that the defendant had
shown no signs of injury at the time he was taken into custody. But all
his interrogators denied that he had been threatened or beaten in any
way. The judge admitted the defendant's confession. He was convicted
of murder and sentenced to death.
Now, in a smaller group, I would at this point go around the room and
ask each of you to guess where this horrid story took place. Some might
say Iran. It would be interesting to see whether there were more votes
for Chile or for Nicaragua. Unfortunately, the facts I just read occurred
only an hour's ffight from here in my own hometown, the city of Chi-
cago. Of course you also need to tell me the year or at least the decade
that we are talking about. The 1920's would be a reasonable guess. But
these facts came from an opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court an-
nounced on April 2, 1987.85 The events themselves go a little bit further
back in time, to February 1982.
I am happy to be able to report that the Illinois Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction, voiding a death sentence for a man who we now
know might very well be wholly innocent.
I do not by any means wish to suggest that this sort of behavior is
commonplace among Chicago police officers or police officers elsewhere.
But I draw several lessons from this case. First, conscientious police of-
ficers have to solve brutal crimes, and they are human beings.' There is
no reason to think that they never lose their self-control or that they need
fewer restraints than any other public officials who exercise power. The
trial judges who find the facts are not perfect either.
Second, we know that power corrupts. A vigorous system of checks
and balances is in the end the only guarantee of a free society. Third, we
85. People v. Wilson, 116 Ill.2d 29, 506 N.E.2d 571 (1987).
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
32 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
are miles away, in both the Miranda doctrine and in the search and
seizure cases, from having an effective system to deter police abuse and to
provide realistic remedies when abuse occurs.
Fourth, what is the responsibility of courts confronted with this sort of
case? It is simply tragic that all of the Supreme Court's recent energies
have been directed to the search for new ways to escape the thrust of the
Warren Court innovations. We need to be moving in precisely the oppo-
site direction.
Finally, my last question in this quiz is simply whether the Illinois
Supreme Court decision suppressing the confession was correct. I as-
sume that the non-lawyers in the audience will have no trouble with this
issue and will respond to it in human terms. But the lawyers and law
students can see that the question is tricky. The confession is inadmissi-
ble only if the defendant was compelled to incriminate himself. Even
after the defendant established horrendous abuses beyond any shadow of
a doubt, there remained the question whether it was the abuses that
caused him to confess. The State of Illinois admitted that the injuries
had occurred in police custody. But it argued that the injuries could
have been inflicted after the confession rather than before. The trial
judge, who heard all the evidence, believed the testimony of the interro-
gators who swore that they never mistreated him. So on the crucial ques-
tion whether all these horrors involve any violation of the defendant's
self-incrimination rights, the trier of fact resolved all the credibility ques-
tions against him.
Was it really proper for the Illinois Supreme Court to reverse? On
what basis can it disregard the factual findings of the judge who heard
the evidence firsthand? That is the kind of dry logic that some justices of
the Burger Court and some prominent judges in our courts of appeals
have applied all too often. As a purely technical matter, it is not neces-
sarily wrong. But as a matter of human intuition and simple common
sense, of course, it is terribly wrong.
The future of individual liberties in this country depends on reinvigo-
rating the system of vigorous checks and balances built into our Bill of
Rights. And it also depends crucially on the willingness of judges to
keep their eyes open to the sordid realities that lie behind the abstractions
of legal doctrine.
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